Religious Extremism and Military Force: Charting a New Strategy for Washington’s ‘Endless Wars’

On December 26, 1991, the United States declared itself the world’s superpower. 44 years of a military and ideological stand-off with the Soviet Union had culminated into a decisive ending, leaving Washington to assume the role of global leadership. The end of the Cold War had, in other words, all but confirmed one fact: that neoliberal democracy was the answer, and it remained the West’s– and precisely Washington’s – obligation to protect and promote this democracy overseas.

After September 11th, 2001, however, the notion of American leadership would change forever. Washington’s answer for peace became an extremist’s reason to fight, and in less than 10 years after the fall of the Iron Curtain, the United States found itself entangled in another “endless” conflict: the war on terror.

With $2 trillion spent, thousands of lives lost, and over 20 years spent in the Islamic world, many Americans have been left to ponder serious questions about their government’s counterterrorism policy: How have Jihadists with a fraction of America’s military power managed to exhaust the United States? Is the tactical prowess of terrorists to blame for Washington’s extended presence abroad?

It is this project’s hope that by embarking on an analysis of drone warfare against terrorist groups, we can pave the path for future research on this subject by discovering a meaningful relationship between Washington’s asymmetrical war tactics and the length of its “Endless Wars.”

SLIDE 1

Hey everyone, my name is Jad, and for my presentation I’m going to be focusing on the effects of U.S. drone strikes on America’s “endless wars.”

SLIDE 2

Though prior to delving into the effects of U.S. drone strikes on America’s foreign engagements, we first must ask ourselves, well, why are we having this discussion in the first place? Where did the term “endless wars” come from?

On December 26, 1991, the United States declared itself the world superpower. Almost 40 years of a military, political, and ideological standoff against the Soviets had culminated into a decisive ending, leading Washington, upon the Union’s collapse, to assume the role of global leadership.

Though in just under 10 years, the United States would find itself entangled once more in another dangerous standoff. Only this time it would be not against a Soviet adversary that threatened its very existence, but rather against a network of jihadists with half its military might.

The September 11th attacks had many impacts on American history, and one of them, undoubtedly, is the fact that 9/11 would change American foreign policy in years to come.

SLIDE 3

The September 11th attacks made it imperative that the United States declare war on terrorism and invade Afghanistan. Also known as “Operation Enduring Freedom”, the Afghan invasion took place for two main reasons; first, to deliver to justice those responsible for 9/11; and second, to render inoperable the operations of Al-Qaeda – and terrorist groups alike – in the country to ensure that another 9/11 doesn’t happen again.

What’s interesting about the Afghan invasion, however, is that it took place for nearly twenty years. You would assume that for a country with the military supremacy of the United States at the time – and arguably still today – that such an operation, premised on two justified objectives, would be feasible, swift, and decisive.

Explanations for Washington’s extended footprint in Kabul are widespread and diverse, ranging from the failure to nation-build in the country to the military underestimation of the stamina of the terrorist enemy. In my research I decided to adopt a different approach to explain the length of the Afghan war; I decided to focus on the role of U.S. drone technology in the conflict, and specifically, how the increased reliance on U.S. drone strikes against terrorists in Afghanistan over the campaign has contributed to the length of the war itself.

SLIDE 4

In the context of the Afghan war, many of my sources of consequence emerged as supporters of drone strikes against terrorists in Afghanistan. To defend their positions, these scholars employed a study of Islamism in their research, suggesting that the inherent animus of Jihadists toward the West renders drone strikes as a necessary deterrence mechanism against terrorists. In this regard, the war on terror is viewed just like the war on crime here in the United States: It will forever be an endless one, and Americans ought to tackle it strategically. This leads to the third point, which makes drones favorable for the very fact that they preserve American life. Drones allow the United States to maintain a military footprint in places of interest without needing to station U.S. troops on the ground.

SLIDE 5

There were, however, scholars in my research who believed that the use of drones against terrorists is counterproductive and hence a very big factor behind the length of the Afghan war
itself. These scholars emphasize the death of innocent Afghans at the hands of US drones throughout the war, suggesting that the dangerous inaccuracy of unmanned aircraft leads to
innocent casualties that in-turn bolsters terrorist recruitment and expands jihadi networks. Innocent deaths at the hands of American drones are also argued to have inspired the evolution
of terror strategies for U.S.-designated terrorist groups like Hamas in Palestine and the recently non-designated Houthis in Yemen. These groups are alleged to have grown to base their
operations in civilian-dense areas, such that when they provoke the United States, Washington will retaliate by killing more innocent civilians, which in-turn bolsters terrorist recruitment and keeps such terrorist groups relevant in their countries’political scenes.

SLIDE 6

My scholars’strict focus on drones as a means of defeating terrorists thus leaves me with a clear research gap to explore, mainly: Can a counterterrorist strategy that is led by a humanitarian compass be more effective against Jihadists than military tactics?

SLIDE 7

I propose a new model of counterterrorist policy that reconsiders terrorist designations and abandons unilateralism. This approach intends to, first, facilitate access to humanitarian aid to
innocent civilians; second, to place pressure on Islamist groups seeking political legitimacy; and third, to give greater bearing to intelligence cooperation to increase the accuracy of future drone strikes if they are needed.

SLIDE 8

Thanks for listening to my presentation.